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as Special Legislation. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821
(Wyo. 1980).

In 1977 the Phillips family purchased a home, built
in 1969, but evacuated it when the foundation and basement
began to collapse after heavy rains in spring 1978.' In fall
1979 the homeowners sued the builder, ABC Builders, Inc.,
for breach of implied warranty of habitability and negligent
construction. The district court granted builder's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the ten year
statute of limitations applicable in construction defect cases,
Section 1-3-111 of the Wyoming Statutes,' had run on
Phillips' suit. The court found that the suit was not commenced until the eleventh year.3
On appeal, homeowners argued the suit was not timebarred for three reasons: (1) the special statute of limitations violated article I, section 34 of the Wyoming Constitution;4 (2) the warranty on the home's foundation exceeded
ten years; and (3) the statute of limitations commenced
running with the discovery of the defect in 1978.' The builder
maintained that the ten year statutory limitation was an
effective bar to the homeowners' action, brought in the
eleventh year after substantial completion of the home, and
that the criticized statute was constitutional. The statute,
builder said, provided a liberal time period compatible with
recent Wyoming case law which expanded the liability of
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1.

Phillips v. ABC Builders, 611 P.2d 821, 822 (Wyo. 1980) [hereinafter cited
in text as Phillips].

2.

WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111

(1977),

provides:

(a) No action to recover damages, whether in tort, contract or otherwise,
shall be brought more than ten (10) years after substantial completion of an improvement to real property, against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, construction or
supervision of construction of the improvement for:
(i) Any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, construction
or observation of construction;
(ii) Injury to any property arising out of any such deficiency; or
(iii) Injury to the person or wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, if an
injury to property or person or an injury causing wrongful death
occurs during the ninth year after substantial completion of the
improvement, an action to recover damages for the injury or wrongful death may be brought within one (1) year after the date on which
the injury occurs.
3. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 823.
4. Brief for Appellants at 14, Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821
(Wyo. 1980). WYO. CONST. art. I, § 34 reads: "All laws of a general nature
shall have a uniform operation."
5. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 823.
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builders in construction defect cases. Furthermore, workrelated perils and difficulties unique to the building trade
provided the rational basis for a statute of limitations which
definitively curtailed liability after ten years.' The Wyoming
Supreme Court, addressing only the constitutional issue,
reversed the dismissal and remanded the action, holding
that the statute of limitations was a special law which arbitrarily immunized a narrow class of persons and closed
Wyoming courts to persons injured by the immunized class
in contravention of article I, section 8' and article III , section
278 of the Wyoming Constitution.'
BACKGROUND

Limitation of Action Statutes and Judicial Review
By its express terms Section 1-3-111 of the Wyoming
Statutes bars claims for design and construction defects
when those defects surface and cause injury to persons or
property more than ten years following substantial completion of the structure. ° This statute, in contradistinction
to other statutes of limitations, contains no provision for
running the limitations period "after the cause of action
accrues."" The ten year time period simply begins to tick
from the date the construction is substantially completed.
If the defect has not surfaced within ten years from that
date or within a one year grace period, the builder and
designer of the structure are immune from suit. 12 Conse-

quently, an action may be time-barred before any damage
has occurred or a right to sue even exists.
6.

Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821
(Wyo. 1980).

7. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides:

All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person,
reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial
or delay.
8. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27 provides in pertinent part:

The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the follow-

. granting to any corporation, association or
ing enumerated cases . .
any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise
individual ....

whatever. In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable
no special law shall be enacted.
9. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 831.
10. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).

11. Compare WYo. STAT. § 1-3-111 with Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-3-103, 1-3-105, 1-3-108,
and 1-3-109 (1977).
12. Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
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A special statute of limitations indicates legislative
disfavor of a specific type of action."3 The ten-year-fromcompletion statute 4 is a special statute of limitations which
indicates legislative disapproval of actions against builders
initiated long after completion of improvements to real property, long after the owner has been in total control and
innumerable external forces may have intervened. 5 Under
these circumstances it is in the public interest to terminate
liability at a definite point in time.1" The ten year statute
of limitations, then, is a prophylactic measure taken by the
legislature to lessen a builder's exposure to extended liability
resulting from the growth of implied warranties and the
abrogation of the completed and accepted rule.'
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not previously construed the subject statute, a 1973 enactment, 8 nor has it
previously ruled on the constitutionality of other statutes of
limitations. However, the general proposition that statutes
of repose are pragmatic devices that foreclose stale claims,
prevent the waste of judicial resources, and spare citizens
from a defense prejudiced by the lapse of considerable time
is accepted in Wyoming jurisprudence. 9 Such statutes express legislative policy decisions to control the right to
litigate, and they must be recognized by the courts.2" Limitation of actions statutes are public policy legislation largely
subject to legislative control. They do not destroy claimant's
rights; rather, they foreclose his remedies. 2' The statutes
find their justification not in theory, but in the deepest
instinct of man that after a significant lapse of time, the
defendant has acquired the superior right."
13. Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177,
1180, 1186 (1950).
14. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).

15. See 1975 Wisc. SESS.

LAWS

Ch. 335, § 1 for an express declaration of such

a policy by the Wisconsin legislature.

16. Id.

17. See generally Note, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and
Builders-Blueprints for Non-action, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 (1969). For
a discussion of the demise of caveat emptor in defective home cases, see
Note, PartialDeath of Caveat Emptor in Wyoming, 11 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 633 (1976).
18. 1973 WYO. SEss. LAws Ch. 82, § 1.
19. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979).
20. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
21. Id.
22. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 476-7 J1897).
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Section 1-3-111 of the Wyoming Statutes singles out
builders and designers of improvements to real property
and affords them special treatment-complete immunity
from suit ten years after they perform their services.23 For
this reason, the statute may be attacked as class or special
legislation. 4 A statute of limitations that applies to a specific
class of individuals may be a valid general law as opposed
to an invalid special law if it passes a two-part test. First,
the classification must have a reasonable basis. 5 Second, the
statute must operate uniformly on all within the class.26
In order to constitute a general law, as opposed
to a special law, there must be some distinguishing
peculiarity which gives rise to the necessity for the
law as to the designated class. A mere classification
for the purpose of legislation without regard to
such necessity is special legislation condemned by
the constitution. It is not what a law includes that
makes it special but what it excludes.27
Application of the two-part rational relationship test
generally results in deference to the legislature, because the
legislature is presumed to have determined that different
conditions rendered the classification proper. s If any state
of facts can be conceived which sustain a classification, the
court assumes those facts,29 because a statute is clothed with
a presumption of constitutionality," and doubts are resolved
in favor of constitutionality."
In short, a statutory classification made for a legitimate
reason results in a valid general law, while a statutory classification without a legitimate reason results in a special law
subject to constitutional attack under article III, section 27
of the Wyoming Constitution. 2
23. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).

24. See 2 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 40.04 (4th ed.
1973).
25. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo. 1978).
26. Id.
27. May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300, 306 (1942).
28. Ludwig v. Harston, 65 Wyo. 134, 197 P.2d 252, 257 (1948).

29. Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980).

30. Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 74 (Wyo. 1978).

31. Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Hershler, 606 P.2d 310, 319 (Wyo.
1980).

32. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27.
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Limitation of Action Statutes and Judicial Review in Other
Jurisdictions
The ten-year-from-completion statute applicable in Wyoming to construction defect actions33 is typical of similar
statutes enacted in at least forty-two states. 4 These statutes
have limitations periods ranging from four to twenty years. 5
The constitutionality of these statutes has been tested in
approximately half of these jurisdictions. 6 The tally on
constitutionality before Phillips7 was ten courts for, nine
against, one uncertain, and two avoiding the question.33
Skinner v. Anderson is the leading case on unconstitutionality. 9 In that case an architect had failed to provide a
home with ventilation in the air conditioning machinery
room resulting in the asphyxiation deaths of the occupants."
The architect invoked the protection of the special statute
of limitations which barred construction defect actions four
years after performance of the services." The Illinois court
found that the statute arbitrarily immunized builders and
architects and denied protection to others similarly situated,
landowners and materialmen, who themselves could be sued
after four years, but who could not seek indemnity from the
protected class.2
Saylor v. Hall takes a position, not widely accepted,43
that the limitations statute applicable in construction defect
cases is unconstitutional because it abolishes the injured
party's negligence action before it legally exists, thereby
denying open access to the courts. 4 In prior decisions the
33. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
34. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 825. For a summary of
these statutes in-the various jurisdictions, see Knapp & Lee, Application of
Special Statutes of Limitations Concerning Design and Construction, 23 ST.
Louis U. L. J. 351 (1979).
35. Id. at 824.
36. Cases are collected in Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 1242 (1979).
37. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
38. Id. at 825-830. Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 1242 (1979).
39. Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) [Hereinafter cited
in text as Skinner].
40. Id. at 589.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 591.
43. Overland Construction Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979) is
the only other case subscribing to the Saylor point of view.

44. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) [hereinafter cited in text as
Saylor].
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Saylor court had construed the Kentucky Constitution to
mean that a wrongful death action was a constitutionally
protected right of action which the legislature could not
abolish.45
A third view, that the special statute of limitations
unconstitutionally denies equal protection of the law, 0
essentially mirrors the Skinner4 7 special law argument.
The leading proponent for constitutionality, Freezer
Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., finds that a real
distinction exists between the protected class of builders and
the unprotected landowners and suppliers and holds the
statute of limitations to be a valid general law."' Several
factors provide a rational basis for the statute: (1) builders
have broader liability than owners and suppliers; (2) builders
have no control over the premises after completion and
relinquishment to the owner; (3) builders have unique
quality control problems; and (4) intervening acts of nature
and man affect the structure through time.49
THE PHILLIPS CASE

The Phillips court found equal authority in other jurisdictions for and against the constitutionality of a statute of
repose like Section 1-3-111 of the Wyoming Statutes." The
court extensively chronicled both points of view5 and decided
to follow the view that such a statute bestowed a discriminatory class privilege rather than the countervailing view
that it did not.52
The court emphasized the Skinner 3 rationale that the
arbitrary immunity conferred on builders and architects,
and denied to others similarly situated, the landowners and
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 222.
Fujioka v. Karn, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973).
Skinner v. Anderson, supra note 38.
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715,
719 (1978)
Id. at 718.
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 825-830.
Id. at 829.
Skinner v. Anderson, supra note 39.
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suppliers, was not reasonably related to appreciable differences between the classes based on the type of service
performed.54 By virtue of Kentucky 5 and Florida" case
authority, but no Wyoming authority, the subject statute
was said to abort a negligence action before it was conceived,
denying the injured party open access to the courts. 7 From
this reasoning the court held that the statute sub judice was
not a statute of limitations at all, but an unconstitutional
grant of immunity from suit and, as a special law, it must
fall. It ran afoul, for good measure, of not one but two constitutional provisions-the open court mandate and the
special law prohibition."
Under the rational relationship test traditionally applied
by the court to statutory classifications,"9 this statute of
limitations could withstand constitutional scrutiny and be
found a general law as ten state courts have found. And,
there is no apparent basis in Wyoming law for the invocation
of the article I, section 8 open court mandate in this particular context."' The Kentucky and Florida cases on which the
Wyoming Supreme Court relied are founded on prior judicial
recognition in those states of a constitutionally protected
right of access to the courts for certain negligence actions.6 2
Such a right of access has not been recognized in Wyoming.6
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 826, 830.
Saylor v. Hall, supra note 44.
Overland Construction Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, supra note 43.
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 831.
Id.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, supra note 25.
See Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 1242 (1979) and Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc.,
supra note 1, at 825-830.
61. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8 has been construed primarily in the sovereign immunity context. See Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 801 (Wyo. 1979).
It has been considered where there was delay in scheduling entry of judgment and trial, Mott v. England, 604 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1979), and where
court proceedings were closed to the public, Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d
322 (Wyo. 1979). Significantly, in Nehring v. Russell, supra note 30, the
guest statute was held unconstitutional under Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 34,
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

and no mention was made of a right of access to the courts which the
legislature could not abolish.
62. Saylor v. Hall, supra note 44; Overland Construction Co., Inc. v. Sirmons,
supra note 43.
63. See note 61, 8upra.
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MOXLEY TIPS THE SCALES

The Phillips court prefaces its constitutional analysis
with a discussion of Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc.64 This
dictum is the keystone of the court's finding of unconstitutionality.
The ten year statute of limitations in construction
defect cases65 is doomed in Phillips" because it directly
conflicts with the court's expansion of builder's liability
in Moxley.6 7 In Moxley, second purchasers of an eighteenmonth-old home sued the builder when the home's electrical
wiring system malfunctioned. The court held that an implied
warranty of habitability, first recognized in Tavares v.
Horstman," extends to subsequent purchasers of a home for
a reasonable time, that the negligent design and construction
action can be pursued by subsequent purchasers against the
builder in the absence of privity, and that builders, as well
as builder-vendors, are legally accountable for their work.6 '
The duration of the builder's. liability is to be measured by
a standard of reasonableness,7" apparently to be determined
ad hoc by the trier of fact. The legislature's statutory limitation of the builder's liability to ten years from substantial
completion of the home 7 collides head-on with the judicial
formulation of a time period based on reasonableness. 2 The
ten year statute of limitations" conflicts with the Moxley
imperative on reasonableness,"4 and constitutional arguments
aside, this effectively sounds the statute's death knell in
Phillips.5
7 importance is not limited to
Consequently, Phillips',"
the narrow finding that a statute of limitations may con64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
.69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979). [hereinafter
cited in text as Moxley].
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., supra note 64.
Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975) [hereinafter cited in text
as Tavares].
Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., supra note 64, at 736.
Id.
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111_(1977).
Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., supra note 64, at 736.
WYo. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
Moxley v. Laramie Builders; Inc., supra note 64, at 736.
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
Id.
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stitute an unconstitutional special law. Its sweep is considerably broader. Phillips77 forecloses the builder's only certain
statutory defense, and it expands once again the homeowner's
rights and remedies as against the builder. It expands rights
and remedies by eliminating a technical barrier against
suits involving older homes.
Phillips is consonant with the developing homeowner
protection law begun in Tavares 9 and extended in MoxleyY'
Tavares involved a one-year-old home ;81 Moxley, an eighteenmonth-old home. 2 In Phillips, the home was nine years old
in a suit initiated more than ten years after the home was
built.83 The Phillips court implicitly stated that warranties
on some parts of a home last considerably longer than ten
years.84 With the trilogy of cases Tavares-Moxley-Phillips,
builders in Wyoming are liable to a heretofore unprecedented
5 opens the floodgates to litigation involving
degree. Phillips"
older homes without setting lines of demarcation, leaving
serious questions unanswered as to the duration of the
builder's liability in such cases.
THE AFTERMATH OF PHILLIPS

Constitutionality of Other Statutes of Limitations
The malpractice statute of limitations is the one other
statute of limitations that classifies on its face. 6 The question
arises whether this statute is constitutionally suspect after
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 68.
Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., supra note 64.
Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 68.
Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., supra note 64.
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 822-23.
Id. at 824.
Id.
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1977), provides in relevant part:
(a) A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services shall
be brought within the greater of the following times:
(i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or
omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more
than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or
omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, error

or omission was:
(A)
(B)

Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or
The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or

omission within the two (2) year period despite the exercise
of due diligence.
.
.
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Phillips.87 The two year malpractice statute,8 8 markedly
similar in purpose to the ten year statute protecting builders
and architects, 9 is of recent vintage,9" provides immunity
from suit two years after the services are rendered,9 ' and
was a response to what legislators saw as increasing liability
on doctors and health care services with attendant rising
insurance rates. 2
The malpractice statute of limitations,"9 though akin to
the statute stricken in Phillips,4 may nevertheless be a valid
general law. It has a provision for accrual of the action with
discovery of the injury,95 and this may be the saving distinction which the Phillips statute lacked. Or, it may well be that
the ten year limitation of action in construction defect cases, 6
is inconsistent with the developing homeowner protection
law and must yield, while the malpractice statute of limitations"7 is consistent with an antipathy toward malpractice
suits and can stand.
However, it is not clear that a real justification exists
for conferring special two year statute of limitations protection on professionals who render services, or for singling
out for special protection licensed professionals and health
care services, when unlicensed nonprofessionals who render
services 8 are not accorded favored treatment. The latter
class must labor under the more lengthy period of liability
provided in the general statute of limitations. The malpractice statute, enacted in 1976,10 has not been construed.
Insofar as it affords arbitrary protection to an elite class of
licensed professional and health care services, it is arguably
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
1976 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 18, § 1.
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1977).
Note, Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas: The New
Legislative Procedure for Amputation of Patient's Rights, 30 BAYLOR L.
REV. 481 (1978).
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1977).
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1977).
For example, builders, repairmen, etc.

-99. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977).
100. 1976 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 18, § 1.
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an untenable special law after Phillips.' To the extent that
it impairs the operation of the discovery rule and runs the
two year period from the date the services are rendered, it
is manifestly unacceptable under the Phillips rationale-that
a statute of limitations cannot abolish an action before it
exists. 1°'
The constitutionality of certain other limitation of
action statutes is also questionable. For instance, a special
statute of repose for products liability actions may not be
viable in Wyoming after Phillips.' Such a statute generally
uses the date the product is delivered to the consumer to
commence the limitations period, which runs for a set number
of years after delivery.' Such a statute immunizes products
manufacturers and designers and closes the courts to the
injured party's action before it accrues, all in derogation
of Phillips.'
UncertaintyRegarding the Applicable Statute of Limitations
in Home Defect Cases
The immediate practical significance of Phillips °6 is
clear. Suits against builders are not automatically barred
if the home is ten or more years old. Now, owners of homes
over ten years old can and should sue on the twin theories
of breach of implied warranty of habitability and negligent
design and construction, if latent defects have recently surfaced. The sole criteria by which to measure the duration
of the builder's liability is the reasonableness standard
101. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
Suppose a homeowner with a collapsing home sues the architect for
years after
negligent design and the builder for negligent construction 2
the defect manifests itself. The architect can get immunity invoking the
protection of the two year malpractice statute, while the builder, who
renders a nonprofessional service, remains suable under the general statute
of limitations which allows four years for tort actions. This type of uneven
result may be impermissible under the Phillips rationale. The four year

tort statute of limitations, Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977), could be applied

evenhandedly to all tortfeasors, professionals and nonprofessionals alike,

to avoid this disparate result.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns) (Supp. 1980). For a list of
current statutes, see Note, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a
Statute of Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 144 n. 67 (1980).
105. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
106. Id.
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iterated in Moxley °7 and reiterated in Phillips.'5 The precise
duration of the builder's liability is left unanswered in
Phillips,'°9 and this leaves a gap in Wyoming homeowner
protection law which needs explication.
With the ten-year-from-completion statute of limitations" O out of the picture, it is uncertain what statute of
limitations applies to the implied warranty of habitability
claim. The basic question is whether the breach of warranty
claim in home defect cases is a tort or a contract action,
governed by a tort or a contract statute of limitations.
Resolution of this issue is crucial to the builder. If the warranty claim can be time-barred under a contract or sales
theory, the homeowner is left with his negligence action
which is harder to prove, especially after the lapse of time.
A short statute of limitations, and one the builder might
argue is applicable, is Section 34-21-299.5 of the Wyoming
Statutes."' The sales statute of limitations is a "sane and
workable statutory scheme", because a warranty is breached
if at all at the time of delivery." 2 By analogizing the house
warranty to warranties on consumer goods and applying this
statute of limitations, the homeowner's implied warranty
claim could be time-barred four years after the home is
delivered to the homeowner. Alternatively, the warranty
action could be barred ten years from the date of delivery
under the general contract statute of limitations."' However, it is apparent in the Phillips-Moxley line of cases that
the court is taking a liberal stand in home defect cases and
107. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., supra note 64, at 736.
108. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 824.
109. Id.
110.
111.

WYo. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 34-21-299.5 (1977), reads in part:
(a) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued. By the

original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to
not less than one (1) year but may not extend it.

(b) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
112. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9 (2d ed. 1980).

113. WYo. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977).
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is not likely to take a restrictive view of the applicable
statute of limitations.
A liberal reading of the applicable limitations statute,
and the one homeowners should opt for, would run the
contractual warranty claim ten years after discovery of the
latent defect and the negligence claim four years after
discovery under the general statute of limitations, Section
1-3-105 of the Wyoming Statutes.114 The discovery rule has
been applied in Wyoming in a case involving the professional
negligence of an engineer who rendered services on a city
water project." 5 There, the statute of limitations was said
to run, not from the completion of the engineer's services,
but from the discovery of the defect, when the injured party
knew or had reason to know that the cause of action existed.11"
The genesis of this rule may be Town Council of Town of
Hudson v. Ladd, where the court adopted an equitable
approach to the running of the statute of limitations." 7 If
an act is uncertain to cause injury, the action accrues and
the statute begins to run at the time damage is sustained." 8
It is likely that the discovery rule will be applied in home
defect cases, since the foundation of the homeowner's claim
is his discovery of a latent defect.
Currently, the statute of limitations applicable to the
implied warranty of habitability claim is uncertain. "The
certainty of fixed time periods clearly serves the interests
of everyone, for even plaintiffs benefit from a sure knowledge of the time after which a suit would be futile.""' 9
114. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977). This writer feels the better view is that the
implied warranty of habitability is a form of strict liability in tort, and
that a tort statute of limitations, four years from discovery of the latent
defect, should apply. The implied warranty here does not "arise out of or
depend upon any contract, but is imposed by the law, in tort, as a matter
of policy." See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
115. Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970).
116. Id. at 304.
117. Town Council of Town of Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419, 262 P. 703, 705
(1928).
118. Id.
119. Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAxv. L. REv. 1177,
1186 (1950).
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Phillips Invites a Legislative Response
In at least three states where courts have stricken
statutes of repose similar to Section 1-3-111 of the Wyoming
Statutes, 120 state legislatures have retaliated by re-enacting
nearly identical replacement statutes again restricting builders' liability. The new Illinois statute is a rule of evidence
creating a presumption of reasonable care if the building
services have not caused injury or damage for six years.2 '
The Hawaii legislature has altered its displaced statute,
declared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, 22 to
include owners and materialmen.' 2 Similarly, the Wisconsin
legislature inserted land surveyors and materialmen, classes
excluded from the earlier statute, and added a savings clause
without appreciably changing the form or the substance of
the original statute of limitations.2 4 Blatantly, legislatures
continue to assert their dislike for construction defect actions
through the use of restrictive statutes of limitations. This
gives rise to an unproductive tug-of-war between court and
statehouse.
The concurrence in Phillips suggests that if the ten year
statute of limitations were all-inclusive it would be constitutional.2 5 This may be an appeal to the legislature to correct
the underinclusiveness and rehabilitate the statute. The dual
finding of unconstitutionality under article I, section 8126
and article III, section 27127 of the Wyoming Constitution
seems to be a calculated move by the majority to discourage
a fix-it statute of the type re-enacted in other states. A
replacement statute of limitations, then, is probably not the
solution in Wyoming.
The Minnesota legislature has taken a more positive
step to provide concrete guidelines in home defect cases, by
defining statutory housing warranties, the effective dates
120. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
121. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 51, § 58 (Smith-Hurd) (Supp. 1979).

122. Fujioka v. Kam, supra note 46.
123. HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1979).
124. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West Supp. 1979).
125. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1, at 831 (concurring opinion).
126. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8.
127. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27.
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of the warranties, the termination dates, and applicable
defenses, such as lack of notice, waiver, etc." 8 Such legislation would have the salutary effect of defining the respective
rights and obligations of owners and builders, delineating
time limits, promoting settlement, and protecting both sides

fairly.
The expansion of the rights and remedies available to
homeowners is a welcome development, but the builder
128. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327A.01-327A.07 (West Supp. 1979), provides in part:
327A.02 Statutory warranties
Subdivision 1. In every sale of a completed dwelling, and in every contract for the sale of a dwelling to be completed, the vendor shall warrant
to the vendee that:
(a) During the one year period from and after the warranty date the
dwelling shall be free from defects caused by faulty workmanship and
defective materials due to noncompliance with building standards;
(b) During the two year period from and after the warranty date,
the dwelling shall be free from defects caused by faulty installation of
plumbing, electrical, heating, and cooling systems; and
(c) During the ten year period from and after the warranty date, the
dwelling shall be free from major construction defects.
Subdivision 2. The statutory warranties provided in this section shall
survive the passing of legal or equitable title in the dwelling to the vendee.
327A.03 Exclusions
The liability of the vendor under sections 327A.01 to 327A.07 is limited
to the specific items set forth in sections 327A.01 to 327A.07 and does not
extend to the following:
(a) Loss or damage not reported by the vendee to the vendor in writing
within six months after the vendee discovers or should have discovered the
loss or damage;
(b) Loss or damage caused by defects in design, installation, or materials which the vendee supplied, installed, or had installed under his
direction;
(c) Secondary loss or damage such as personal injury or property
damage;
(d) Loss or damage from normal wear and tear;
(e) Loss or damage from normal shrinkage caused by drying of the
dwelling within tolerances of building standards;
(f) Loss or damage from dampness and condensation due to insufficient ventilation after occupancy;
(g) Loss or damage from negligence, improper maintenance or alteration of the dwelling by parties other than the vendor;
(h) Loss or damage from changes in grading of the ground around
the dwelling by parties other than the vendor;
(i) Landscaping or insect loss or damage;
j) Loss or damage from failure to maintain the dwelling in good
repair;
(k) Loss or damage which the vendee, whenever feasible, has not taken
timely action to minimize;
(1) Loss or damage which occurs after the dwelling is no longer used
primarily as a residence;
(in)
Accidental loss or damage usually described as acts of God, including, but not limited to: fire, explosion, smoke, water escape, windstorm,
hail or lightning, falling trees, aircraft and vehicles, flood, and earthquake,
except when the loss or damage is caused by failure to comply with building
standards;
(n) Loss or damage from soil movement which is compensated by
legislation or covered by. insurance;
(o) Loss or damage due to soil conditions where construction is done
upon lands owned by the vendee and obtained by him from a source independent of the vendor.
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should not be given shortshrift. The builder should know
three things: (1) when the liability against him commences
and ends; (2) what his responsibilities are under the law;
and (3) what concomitant duties the homeowner bears.
Considering the likely post-Phillips proliferation of lawsuits
involving older homes and the unprecedented liability thrust
on builders, the answers to these questions should not be
doled out piecemeal by court rule.
Legislative guidelines on home warranties would improve both the nebulous concept of liability based on reasonableness 29 and the inflexibility of the ten year statute of
limitations 3 ' or its possible successor. Such legislation would
define the perimeters of the builder's liability, alleviate
uncertainty and promote commercial stability. There has
been a legislative response in other states following a
Phillips-type decision and some response, hopefully an
ameliorative one, may be anticipated in Wyoming.
CONCLUSION

The statute of limitations immunizing architects and
builders from suit ten years after completion of improvements
to real property is an unconstitutional special law. Statutes
of limitations which arbitrarily protect discrete classes and
abolish actions before they legally exist, like the malpractice
statute of limitations or statutes of repose in products
liability cases which have been passed in other states, are
suspect after Phillips.3 '
Practically speaking, Phillips'2 removes a technical
barrier from suits involving homes and other buildings more
than ten years old. Owners of older homes can and should
sue builders and designers if latent defects have recently
surfaced, regardless of the age of the home.
The running of the statute of limitations in home defect
cases is uncertain. To remedy this, the implied warranty
129. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., supra note 64, at 736.
130. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111 (1977).
131. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., supra note 1.
132. Id.
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action should be labelled a tort or a contract, with an identifiable statute of limitations and with due allowance for the
operation of the discovery rule.
The gradual liberalization of homeowner rights and
remedies, begun in Tavares'3 and continued in Moxley,"'
is extended again in Phillips."5 The court suggests that ten
years is not long enough for warranties on some parts of
a house. The Phillips court impliedly recognizes the incongruity of extending a warranty to the second buyer in
Moxley" 6 and then arbitrarily limiting that warranty to a
ten year period from the date of completion, when the court
had explicitly committed itself to a reasonableness standard.
The protection granted in Moxley'll would be paper protection, if the immutable ten year statute of limitations were
to prevail in Phillips."' Phillips"' is a logical extension of
Tavares14 ° and Moxley' 41 and the three cases together are a
cohesive trilogy which gradually expand the homeowner's
rights and remedies and recognize that a home is not built
to last ten years and one day.
Yet, with the ten year statute of limitations stricken
and homeowners' rights expanded to an unprecedented
degree, homeowner suits involving older homes may proliferate post-Phillips without discernible limits. Legislatures
in other states have responded with replacement statutes of
limitations, which again restrict construction defect actions.
In Wyoming a more viable solution is not another statute
of limitations but legislative guidelines defining statutory
warranties. This legislation could foster policies of repose
and predictability in this area of the law which Section
1-3-111 of the Wyoming Statutes 42 failed to provide.
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